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Abstract Two theories dominate the current debate on group agency: functional-
ism, as endorsed by Bryce Huebner and Brian Epstein, and interpretivism, as
defended by Deborah Tollefsen, and Christian List and Philip Pettit. In this paper, I
will give a new argument to favour functionalism over interpretivism. I discuss a
class of cases which the former, but not the latter, can accommodate. Two features
characterise this class: First, distinct groups coincide, that is numerically distinct
groups share all their members at all time. Second, we have access to the inner
mechanisms of the groups agents, because members know what they have decided
on. I construct a counterexample with these features allowing me to reject inter-
pretivism about group agency in favour of functionalism.
Keywords Group agency  Functionalism  Interpretivism  Social ontology 
Coinciding groups  Intentional stance
1 Introduction
The debate on group agency raises two questions: Are there group agents, that is
groups with minds of their own? And if so, what makes the attribution of
propositional attitudes, such as beliefs, intentions, and desires, to them correct?1
Two theories answer these questions and dominate the current debate on group
agency. On the functionalist side, we find the proposals by Huebner (2014) and
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Epstein (2015, 2017). On the interpretivist side, there are the accounts of Tollefsen
(2015), as well as List and Pettit (2011).
In this paper, I will give a new argument to favour functionalism over
interpretivism. There is a class of cases which the former, but not the latter, can
accommodate. Two features characterise this class: First, they are cases of
coinciding groups. Although the groups are numerically distinct, they share all their
members at all times. As a consequence, such groups overlap in their behaviour.
Second, in the instances of this class the members’ knowledge of what they have
decided provides access to the inner mechanisms of the group agents. The members
know what the group intended, because they participated in the formation of the
intention. I construct a counterexample with these features allowing me to reject
interpretivism about group agency in favour of functionalism.
I start by introducing the distinction between functionalism and interpretivism, at
the heart of which lies the difference between mechanisms on the inside and
behaviour on the outside. In contrast to functionalists, who can take inner-
mechanisms as well as outer-behaviour as determining the correctness of attributing
propositional attitudes, interpretivists limit themselves to outer-behaviour. Conse-
quently, interpretivists are often accused of overgenerating agents. After having
discussed the interpretivist responses to this charge, I present my own argument
against interpretivism. As I show, especially challenging problems arise from
examples of coinciding group agents, undermining defence strategies devised by
interpretivists. I end by suggesting how functionalist accounts of group agency can
succeed where interpretivists fail.
2 The functionalist principle
Since the introduction of multiple realizability arguments, functionalism has
become the standard account of propositional attitudes.2 One can distinguish a
variety of functionalisms,3 but they share the functionalist principle as a criterion for
whether an entity, be it a group or an individual, has a propositional attitude:
(F) An entity has propositional attitudes, if and only if it has states with the
appropriate functional profiles.
Functional profiles are the full specification of the causal roles4 states of a system
have to play to realise propositional attitudes. Ramsey sentences, that is sentences
which describe the theory of propositional attitudes completely but replace mention
of them with existentially quantified variables (cf. Lewis 1970), provide a way to
2 For an introductory discussion of multiple realizability see Funkhouser (2007). For a recent critical take
see Polger and Shapiro (2016).
3 For Putnam’s machine-state functionalism see the various papers collected in Putnam (1975), for
psycho-functionalism see Fodor (1968) and Block and Fodor (1972). See also ‘‘Some Varieties of
Functionalism’’ in Shoemaker (2003).
4 Strictly speaking, a functional profile might also specify other roles, for example whether states ground
each other. This subtlety is insubstantial for my argument.
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specify such functional profiles. Functionalism of the kind I will discuss claims that
propositional attitudes can be defined via Ramsey sentences.5
For a garden-variety functionalism, such Ramsey sentences would describe the
causal roles of the propositional attitudes.6 The Ramsey sentence for a belief that it
rains might look something like this: Ax (x responds to evidence of rain
appropriately; together with other relevant states, x leads to carrying an
umbrella,…).7 In a complete theory of propositional attitudes, the other relevant
states, such as the desire to stay dry, would also have to be cashed out using
existentially quantified variables and appropriate description in the Ramsey sentence.
In the end, no mention of propositional attitudes should remain in the sentence itself.
Proponents of group agency have a natural affinity with such a functionalism. If
all there is to having a propositional attitude is having a state with a functional
profile appropriately specifying causal roles, then why should groups not have
propositional attitudes? Since this functionalism allows for the realisation of
propositional attitudes in widely diverging ways, the realisation by states of a group
becomes a live possibility.
Consider a coarse-grained functionalism, according to which ‘‘mental states are
internal states of an agent that are caused by certain inputs to the system and cause
both certain other internal states and certain behaviour outputs, where these causal
dynamics will be specified by common sense.’’ (Tollefsen 2015: 81, my emphasis)
For example, we attribute the belief that the supermarket is at the corner to an
individual, because that’s where they go when they want to buy groceries. Given the
desire to buy groceries, the candidate state for realising a belief about the
supermarket location produces the behaviour we would expect from such a belief.
The state plays the appropriate causal roles and thus exhibits the functional structure
of a belief that the supermarket is located at the corner.
On such a functionalism, attributing minds to groups appears plausible. A
corporation could have a state meeting the functional description of a propositional
attitude. For example, if a corporation shows the behaviour of entering a market,
this might be part of the functional description of having the belief that it can make
profit in this market. Again, the state which serves as a candidate for realising a
belief state produces the expected behaviour together with other states. The
functionalist strategy appears readily extendable so that the main difficulty lies in
specifying the functional profiles correctly to attribute attitudes to the appropriate
groups and individuals, but not beyond.
Functionalist approaches to group agency have a long history going at least back
to Block’s China Brain (1978), purportedly a counterexample to functionalism, and
5 One kind of functionalism not falling under this description might be Millikan’s (2004) teleological
functionalism. There might be further exceptions.
6 However, a Ramsey sentence could also specify a realiser and for example define a certain
propositional attitude as only being instantiated by a certain kind of neuron. This would be an unusual
realiser-dependent functionalism, which I ignore in the following.
7 In my example, the propositional content of the belief is written into the Ramsey sentence. One might
try to avoid this, which has the benefit of allowing one specification for all beliefs. I chose the approach
solely for the purpose of illustration.
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Brooks’ (1986) paper ‘‘Group Minds’’, which endorses the possibility of a city being
the functional equivalent of a brain. Huebner (2014) is one of the recent proponents
of a functionalist account of group agency. While he argues that the functional
profile of propositional attitudes such as beliefs and desires are rather demanding, he
suggests that some groups meet the requirements and become full agents. Epstein
(2015, 2017) has also endorsed a functionalist theory of group agency.8 I will argue
that such approaches are to be preferred over the interpretivist accounts by throwing
up a problem which the functionalists can solve, but the interpretivists cannot.
3 The interpretivist principle
List and Pettit (2011) in Group Agency, and Tollefsen (2015) in Groups as Agents,
endorse Dennett’s theory of the intentional stance in place of coarse-grained
functionalism. To use the intentional stance ‘‘is to set aside non-intentional
possibilities of explanation, to presuppose that the system under explanation is an
agent, and to try to ascribe representations and motivations to it that make sense of
its actions’’ (List and Pettit 2011: 23).9 Thus, the intentional stance is a certain
mindset with which a situation can be approached for explanation.
Consider an example adapted from List and Pettit (2011: 19–31): I look at a
robot’s behaviour and predict its future behaviour by ascribing propositional
attitudes such as desires and beliefs. The robot moves towards some cylinders that
are lying down and puts them upright. I ascribe perceptual beliefs and a desire for
upright cylinders to the robot. To test my ascription, I topple a cylinder. The robot
puts it upright again. Having acquired the belief that a cylinder is lying down, the
robot satisfies its desire for upright cylinders by showing appropriate behaviour. My
ascription results in successful predictions, which is explanatorily more powerful
than a non-intentional description. Accordingly, the robot is an agent with
perceptual beliefs and the desire to put cylinders upright.
In agreement with List and Pettit, Tollefsen describes interpretivism as ‘‘the view
that, if we can successfully make sense of another being—understand and interpret
its behaviour by using our folk psychology—it is an intentional agent’’ (Tollefsen
2015: 97). We interpret the behaviour of an object by ascribing propositional
attitudes, and if the interpretation allows us to predict the object’s behaviour, the
success supports the ascriptions. In fact, if the predictions consistently prove correct,
this renders the ascriptions true.10
8 Epstein’s version departs from the others, however. He argues that whether we should attribute agency
to a particular group depends on its kind rather than the features specific to the particular group. That is,
we would attribute group agency to a particular committee in virtue of it being a member of the kind
committee (Epstein 2017).
9 See also Dennett (1987: 15, 1991b).
10 There are two comments to be made about my characterisation of interpretivism at this point: First,
interpretivism typically also allows for an indeterminism where there is no deeper fact whether an
ascription is correct or not (see Mo¨lder 2010: 109–110). Second, I discuss a version of constitutive
interpretivism, which makes interpretation from the intentional stance constitutive for having
propositional attitudes, for distinguishing various forms of interpretivism see Mo¨lder (2010: 75–85).
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To use an example of a group, if the philosophy department’s library team shows
the behaviour of sorting books on its shelves, I attribute to it the desire to have its
books well-ordered and the belief that the sorting behaviour helps to achieve this
goal. These ascriptions allow me to predict that if I put a book from the shelf on the
table, the team will put it back in the right place. The success of the prediction
supports my ascriptions. Furthermore, if all such predictions deducible from the
ascription are successful, this makes the ascription true.
The success of behavioural predictions determines the truth of the ascriptions, but
since ordinary people miss facts about the behaviour of entities, interpretivists
assume an interpreter who is idealised in that she has access to all behavioural facts
about the entity in question and has the capacity to process this information. Thus,
we can formulate the following interpretivist principle11:
(I) An entity has propositional attitudes, if and only if an idealised interpreter
would successfully predict the behaviour of that entity from the intentional
stance by ascribing these attitudes.
The underlying intuition is that if an idealised interpreter of the behaviour can
attribute propositional attitudes with success we will not ask for anything more. For
support, interpretivists often just point to our folk psychological practices (see the
Tollefson quote above). From this perspective, the predictive success is all we
expect from a system with a mind. Hence, the interpretivists offer their own
principle for the attribution of propositional attitudes, raising the question how it
relates to the functionalist principle.
4 Functionalism and interpretivism: the outer-behaviour/inner-
mechanism distinction
According to Tollefsen and in contrast to functionalism, interpretivism entails that
‘‘[p]ropositional attitudes are not internal states of a system but dispositional states
of whole systems’’ (Tollefsen 2015: 110, see also Mo¨lder 2010: 75). On this picture,
the truth of an ascription of propositional attitudes does not depend on any facts
about the internal life of the entity. In the case of the robot its movements count, but
not the calculations by its processor unit.12 In the case of the library team, moving
the books onto the shelf counts, but not the internal deliberation about where to put
them.
Functionalist accounts of mind typically do not care whether agents are made of
carbon or silicon, but they often demand that internal states fulfil certain functional
11 One might emphasise in addition that the intentional ascription has to provide more predictive power
than other available approaches, but I leave this qualification out from the principle to keep it simple.
12 As List and Pettit put it, ‘‘make-up—be it neural, electronic, or perhaps of another kind—may provide
indirect evidence about what performance to expect in different situations, but the performance itself
should dictate the representations and motivations we ascribe to the agent.’’ (List and Pettit 2011: 28). At
best the internal states can provide evidence, but they are not determining the truth of the ascription.
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roles to realise propositional attitudes. Tollefsen denies such internal realisers any
constitutive role in attributing propositional attitudes.
The distinction becomes slightly muddled in List and Pettit’s work, who not only
endorse Dennett’s intentional stance theory like Tollefsen, but also consider
themselves functionalists of sorts. Since their endorsement of Dennett’s intentional
stance is beyond doubt (see List and Pettit 2011: 11, 13, 23), we should understand
List and Pettit as using an unusually broad notion of functionalism, which does not
commit to the existence of internal states and is therefore compatible with
interpretivism.13 This reading is corroborated by List and Pettit’s statement that they
‘‘gestured towards a functionalist account of mind in analyzing intentional states—
beliefs and desires—in terms of the roles they play in directing the agent and
guiding action’’ (List and Pettit 2011: 171).14 List and Pettit do not mention any
internal realization of mental states in their characterisation of functionalism, thus
remaining compatible with an interpretivist construal.15
In the following I use ‘‘functionalism’’ for non-interpretivist versions of
functionalism, that is versions of functionalism according to which the Ramsey
sentence of propositional attitudes involve internal states. Thus, the separation of the
two theories relies on a distinction between outer-behaviour and inner-mechanism.
Interpretivism relies on a criterion for this distinction, which is surprisingly hard to
pin down.
For individuals giving an approximate criterion for the outer-behaviour/inner-
mechanism distinction proves easy enough:16 Everything that stays within the skull
is part of the inner-mechanism rather than the outer-behaviour. For example,
Dennett contrasts his position with that of Fodor who holds ‘‘that the pattern of
belief must in the end be a pattern of structures in the brain’’ (Dennett 1991b: 30, see
13 While this notion of functionalism is in conflict with Tollefsen’s way of carving up the theory space, it
is by no means unprecedented. Dennett has described himself as a functionalist (e.g. Dennett 1991a: 31)
without having given up on his interpretivism.
14 List and Pettit also refer to the David Lewis papers ‘‘How to Define Theoretical Terms’’ and ‘‘An
Argument for the Identity Theory’’ in this context. It is not entirely clear what to make of this reference.
For example, in ‘‘How to Define Theoretical Terms’’, Lewis (1970) expresses the hope that we can make
sense of theoretical terms such as those for propositional attitudes without multiple realizability. That
would not bode well for group agency. The importance of Ramsey sentences is compatible with
interpretivism, since the latter only puts restrictions on what the sentences can contain: no reference to
internal states. ‘‘An Argument for the Identity Theory’’ Lewis (1966) argues for the identity of every
experience with physical state. He thinks of neurochemical states in particular. This paper is harder to
square with interpretivism of the Dennetian kind, but if one takes behavioural states instead of
neurochemical states as the realisers, it becomes possible.
15 Tollefsen reads List and Pettit as suggesting ‘‘that the formation of group judgements […] somehow
realizes group beliefs’’ (Tollefsen 2015: 81). According to Tollefsen, List and Pettit endorse a coarse-
grained functionalism in which the functional profile includes internal mechanisms. I consider this a
misreading, which is invited, first, by List and Pettit’s unusually broad notion of functionalism and,
second, by their extensive discussions of the internal mechanisms of group agents in the later parts of
their books. But this discussion does not concern the constitution of propositional attitudes.
16 This matter is complicated by the debate on the extended mind (see Clark and Chalmers 1998), which
is also discussed by Tollefsen as supporting group agency (2006, 2015). In the following, I will leave this
complication aside.
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also page 42). We might make some exceptions, but as a general heuristic the skull-
or intracranial-criterion will do.
This criterion, however, proves unsuitable for drawing the distinction with regard
to groups. Groups do not have a skull of their own. Neither List and Pettit, nor
Tollefsen, offer an explicit criterion suited for groups, leaving it to their readers to
judge where inner-mechanism ends, and outer-behaviour starts. But while explicit
limitations are lacking, the dialectic of the debate imposes restrictions on how to
construe the outer-behaviour/inner-mechanism distinction.
For interpretivism about group agency to be interesting, enough events need to
fall into the inner-mechanism category. An over-extended category of outer-
behaviour renders the difference to functionalism negligible. Interpretivism about
group agency would not be of interest if it used all information about documents and
discussion within the group as the basis for attributing propositional attitudes.
In the case of individuals, any neural behaviour falls into inner-mechanism rather
than the outer-behaviour box. Otherwise Dennett’s attempt to distinguish himself
from Fodor’s position would fail. But if individuals are roughly the analogue to
neurons for group agents, does then fall everything that is individual behaviour into
the inner-mechanism box too? One should not push the analogy between neurons
and individuals beyond its limits. While Tollefsen (2015: 106–107) suggests that an
interpretivist can ignore some individual behaviour, for example they could ignore
the actions of individual managers to predict the Ford Motor Company’s response to
an increase in gas prices, ruling out all individual behaviour goes too far.
Consider the library team sorting the books again. If we ignore the behaviour of
all members of the team, no group behaviour would remain. The library team
showed the behaviour of sorting books, but so did the relevant individuals. At least
for groups exhaustively constituted by individuals we want to allow that an event
can be both outer-behaviour of the group and individual behaviour. However, this
individual behaviour should not be internal to the group, but rather relate it to the
outside. In the book sorting case the individual members engage with the books,
which are external to the library team. A deliberation about book sorting, however,
would remain internal, because the members only engage with one another.
Let me then propose the following criterion: A behaviour of a constituent17 of a
group is an instance of an outer-behaviour of the group if and only if the behaviour
engages with an entity external to the group. Only those outer-behaviour events of
constituents of the group are outer-behaviour events of the group which involve
non-constituents as well.
Without limiting which individual behaviour counts as outer-group behaviour in
such a way, the interpretivist approach to group agency is not interestingly different
from its functionalist rival. After all, the functionalist will often identify the internal
states of group agents realising propositional attitudes with states of individuals and
their behaviour. The constituents of these states can then no longer serve as the
17 I use the notion of a constituent rather than a member to allow that more than individuals might
constitute a group and contribute to the behaviour of the group.
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based for applying the intentional stance on pain of rendering interpretivism and
functionalism effectively equivalent.
Of course, difficulties remain for applying the distinction and a full interpretivist
account would have to address them. For example, my criterion leaves open what
counts as an engagement or involvement of non-constituents. The interpretivist
should sharpen the criterion further such that neither too much nor too little ends up
counting as external behaviour. Moving air or radiating heat are not enough
engagement with external entities for the behaviour of a constituent of a group to
count as an instance of an outer-behaviour of the group. Otherwise all behaviour by
group members, including internal deliberations between group members, would
count as outer behaviours of the group. Our neuronal activities also create external
traces in an MRI and interpretivism does not consider them behaviour.
For the purpose of the present paper, we will gloss over the challenge of
specifying the criterion further, which is only charitable towards the interpretivist. If
it turned out that there is no principled criterion for distinguishing outer-behaviour
from inner-mechanisms, then this would just settle the issue in favour of
functionalism. My counter-example will apply independently of interpretivists
resolving this difficulty.
5 The overgeneration worry
While only taking outer-behaviour into account distinguishes interpretivism from
functionalism, it raises the worry that interpretivism hopelessly over-attributes
agency. The worry suggests that this limitation on the basis of interpretation leads
interpretivism to attribute agency to too many groups (as well as other entities).
Although my counterexample will not concern such an overgeneration of agency
attributions, it also turns on interpretivism limiting the basis of interpretation to
outer-behaviour. Hence, the overgeneration worry and the responses to it have
bearing on my counterexample. We will first consider the general version of the
overgeneration worry as it has already received ample discussion in the literature
and then turn to the special case of interpretivist accounts of group agency.
A variety of authors have suggested that interpretivism wrongly attributes mental
properties to systems which lack them. Lycan (1987: 5) proposed the tinfoil man
against behaviourist theories of mind,18 Peacocke (1983) brought in Martian
marionettes, and Block (1981) has his Blockheads. These are all variations on a
theme. I focus on the Martian marionettes, since Peacocke explicitly directs the
example against Dennett’s theory.
Peacocke invites us to imagine a human body without a brain; instead a radio
transmitter controls the nerves. A computer on Mars calculates the behaviour and
manages to make the body, its marionette, behave like an ordinary human. As
Peacocke observes, the marionette ‘‘is voluminously and reliably predictable via the
18 Bryce Huebner (2014: 90) has pointed out that the tinfoil man example speaks against attributing
agency to groups based only on the intentional stance since it speaks against interpretivism in general.
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intentional strategy, as voluminously and reliably as for any normal human being’’
(Peacocke 1983: 205). Interpretivism gives the wrong conclusion for the Martian
marionette. It finds an agent where there is only a puppet. In this case, looking only
at the outer-behaviour appears to give the wrong answer. A functionalist would look
under the skin and consider internal states. The interpretivists cannot accept this
solution and has to come up with another one.
Bruno Mo¨lder, whom Tollefsen (2015: 97) quotes as a recent defender of
interpretivism, has responded to the marionette-type counterexamples. He admits
that looking at predictive success is insufficient, but suggests that folk psychology
imposes restrictions on the possible objects of the intentional stance. According to
Mo¨lder ‘‘[i]t is part of folk psychology that people have beliefs whereas tables and
lecterns do not’’ (Mo¨lder 2010: 193). The Martian marionette does not fall into the
range of objects covered by folk psychology, because it does not take objects with
empty heads seriously. If folk psychology only covers a limited range of objects,
then it constrains our interpretations and rules out Martian marionettes. To avoid
this kind of response, my counterexample to interpretivist accounts of group agency
will concern mundane examples of groups.
Turning from the general case of over-attribution to the special case of
overgenerating group agency, Mo¨lder’s solution falls short. Many troubling
instances of overgeneration of group agency do not rely on sci-fi scenarios and
empty heads, but rather concern actual groups. For many groups, we can raise the
question whether we will not always have some predictive success using the
intentional stance towards it. Might we not predict some outer-behaviour of the
global human population using intentional vocabulary? For example, we can
roughly predict the behaviour of humanity by ascribing to it the intention to increase
the global temperature. Nonetheless, humanity does not form a group agent, and
certainly not one intending global warming. Interpretivist accounts of group agency
have to provide criteria for excluding such attributions of propositional attitudes to
groups.
List and Pettit (2011: 24–25) introduce strict rationality criteria, for example that
attitudes must track facts, that attitudes be internally coherent, and that actions must
follow attitudes. Using these criteria List and Pettit generate much fewer ascriptions
of propositional attitudes. For example, they would no longer attribute such attitudes
to humanity as a group since its behaviour does not allow such rational
interpretation. For most intentions we might ascribe to humanity, we will find
violations of rationality. While we have some predictive success attributing the
intention to increase the global temperature, some of humanity’s behaviour, such as
a reduction of coal plants, conflicts with it.
In addition to the rationality criteria, Tollefsen (2015: 102, 108) reminds us that
Davidson suggested linguistic intelligibility as an interpretivist requirement. An
agent must engage in linguistic behaviour which we can interpret. Since we cannot
attribute any rational linguistic output to humanity, it is no agent. In effect,
Tollefsen narrows further what counts as a successful predictive interpretation from
the intentional stance: It must include successful predictions which are either based
on or concern linguistic behaviour.
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List and Pettit, and Tollefsen have managed to narrow down the number of group
agents they postulate. Independently of whether these restrictions succeed in
blocking the overgeneration of group agents, they limit potential counterexamples
for my purposes. The group agents I present have to meet List and Pettit’s
rationality restrictions and engage in linguistic behaviour as demanded by Tollefsen.
Still, even with these limitations, interpretivist accounts cannot evade the problems
resulting from coinciding group agents.
6 Towards the counterexample
The interpretivist principle implies that any difference between the mental lives of
two group agents can be explained with reference to the outer-behaviour of the
groups by an idealised interpreter. This consequence of the interpretivist principle
creates a problem for certain cases of coinciding group agents.19
Consider two coinciding groups, which are completely constituted by human
individuals. Perhaps no such individualist constitution holds for Tollefsen’s
example of the Ford Motor Company. The manufacturing plants, paper contracts,
or its computer systems might also partially constitute the company,20 but that is not
the case for all groups. To keep things simple, we consider the committees of a
philosophy department and stipulate that they are exhaustively constituted by their
individual members.21
The philosophy department creates these committees by randomly assigning its
members to them. It throws all the names of the faculty in a big urn and picks five
from it to establish one committee. To form the next committee, it throws the five
names back in and draws again. Following this procedure, the department fills up
one committee after another. In our example and by pure chance, the teaching
committee ends up with the same members as the public engagement committee.
As stipulated, the committees are not constituted by anything other than the
individuals and their constituents. In such a case, each event that is an outer-
behaviour of the teaching committee is also an outer-behaviour of the public
engagement committee. This overlap in behaviour follows from sharing the material
constitution and the limited notion of behaviour at play here. The shared
constitution base is stipulated by the example, but the notion of behaviour follows
from interpretivism: On an interpretivist account, behaviour must precede any
attributions of mentality since it serves as the basis for such attributions from the
19 Coinciding groups have been endorsed by most account of group ontology, including Gilbert (1992:
220–221), Uzquiano (2004), Sheehy (2006), Ritchie (2013, 2015), Epstein (2015, 2017), and Thomasson
(2016).
20 Brian Epstein’s way of handling differs from that of other authors. While he states that ‘‘[a] group is a
thing constituted by and only by individual people’’ (Epstein 2015: 133), he considers many social entities
which are often treated as groups not to have the required individualist constitution. For example, he
asserts that corporations and universities are not groups (see Epstein 2015: 133).
21 This individualistic constitution is not strictly a requirement for the counterexample, as along as other
constituting entities are not involved in the particular decision processes we discuss in the course of the
example. The assumption only serves to simplify the discussion.
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intentional stance. Thus, the description of the groups’ behaviour cannot depend on
any ascriptions of mentality. It has to be outer-behaviour and what remains is the
criterion we have introduced above: A behaviour of a constituent22 of a group is an
instance of an outer-behaviour of the group if and only if the behaviour engages
with an entity external to the group. Clearly, if two groups share all constituents, in
this case their individual members, then their outer-behaviour coincides. It follows
that when the teaching committee shows the behaviour of sending out a text about
pedagogical methods, the public engagement committee shows the same
behaviour.23
Given that the two groups exhibit the same behaviour, the question arises which
of the two committees had the intention to distribute the text. Assume that it was the
teaching committee, not the public engagement committee, which intended to send
out the text. How can an interpretivist explain this difference in propositional
attitudes between the groups given their behavioural coincidence?
While it becomes difficult for interpretivists to pry the mental lives of two
coinciding group agents apart, they can still respond to this example. The behaviour
of the two groups might be indistinguishable, but the features of the behaviour
clearly indicate which committee is acting in sending out the text. The email might
be signed by the teaching committee or it might be sent from the email account of
the teaching committee. While the behaviour is the same, its features allow for
differences in propositional attitudes between the groups from an interpretivist
perspective.
Many cases do not allow this response, however, because the behaviour lacks any
disambiguating features. For example, one of the groups might intend to engage in
some clandestine action that leaves not such identifying behavioural traces. Assume
that the teaching committee forms an intention to play a prank on the department.
The group decides to hide alarm clocks, which will disrupt lectures. Clearly, in this
case the behaviour will not carry the signature of the teaching committee. The outer-
behaviour consists only of the members of both groups buying alarm clocks and
stowing them away in hidden corners. There is no sign here which of the two groups
intended the action.
Or consider an example where the public engagement committee invites
everyone to the pub by sending around an email from an account which is not
clearly linked to one or the other group. If the email lacks a signature of the
committee and any other identifying marks, then one cannot tell from the behaviour
which group intended to send out the pub invitation.
Generally, any example will do in which the outer-behaviour has not features
justifying a difference in attribution of propositional attitudes. Sending unsigned
22 I use the notion of a constituent rather than a member to allow that more than individuals might
constitute a group and contribute to the behaviour of the group.
23 One option I am not considering here and in the following is that groups might exist intermittently, so
that the teaching committee only exists whenever the public engagement committee doesn’t. While this
would work against my examples here, they could easily be adapted to avoid this issue. The problem does
not arise for my final counterexample.
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emails from generic accounts, playing hidden pranks, or any other action either
group might engage in suffices. These cases are so easy to come by for two reasons:
1. The behaviour of the coinciding groups is shared, that is the outer-behaviour in
which interpretivism is interested does not differ.
2. Often the only identifying marks are found in the deliberation within the group,
but the deliberative behaviour between group members does not count as group
behaviour.
As discussed above, a behaviour of a constituent of a group is an instance of an
outer-behaviour of the group if and only if the behaviour engages with an entity
external to the group. In both the case of the prank and pub-invitation, knowledge of
the internal deliberations i.e. knowing at which group meeting the members decided
to pull the prank and at which they decided to invite everyone to the pub, would
allow a difference in attribution of propositional attitudes. The interpretivist,
however, cannot take these inner-mechanisms as difference-making on pain of
becoming indistinguishable from the functionalist.
These examples put pressure on the interpretivists, but they have still one trick up
their sleeves. In addition to actual behaviour, behavioural dispositions might count
in the attribution of propositional attitudes.
7 The dispositionalist complication
Interpretivists do not just look to realised behaviour but consider also behavioural
dispositions. For example, Tollefson writes that ‘‘[p]ropositional attitudes are not
internal states of a system but dispositional states of whole systems’’ (Tollefsen
2015: 110). Such dispositions might allow for fine-grained attributions of
propositional attitudes when actual behaviour fails to do the job.
This dispositionalist move solves the problem with the prank and pub cases. The
two committees have dispositions to show behaviour clarifying which committee
played the prank or sent out the pub invitation under appropriate circumstances.
Prompted by an inquiry, perhaps enforced by threats of being fired, the groups
would clarify the intentions of the committees. However, the dispositionalist move
risks making interpretivism uninteresting as a position.
As emphasised, interpretivism is substantially different from functionalism
because it avoids giving the inner-mechanisms a role in making ascriptions of
propositional attitudes true. Whatever the behavioural dispositions are, they must be
such that they are not merely read off the inner-mechanisms. Since interpretivism
takes the attribution of propositional attitudes to be all about prediction of
behavioural patterns, pointing to an unrealisable disposition, for example a finkish
disposition, is an illegitimate move within the framework. Only by limiting
themselves in such a way, can interpretivists turn dispositionalist without becoming
uninteresting.
This limitation of the dispositional move is corroborated by Mo¨lder’s discussion
of Dennett in which the former argues for the following construal of behavioural
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dispositions: ‘‘On this reading, the dispositional patterns are just any patterns of the
system that are apt to appear or become manifest to interpreters.’’ (Mo¨lder 2010:
112) While this quote offers a broad notion of dispositions, it acknowledges the
importance of the pattern being apt to manifest itself to an interpreter.
For the previous examples, this limitation does not matter. The teaching
committee has a plausibly realisable disposition to reveal its authorship of the prank.
The public engagement committee has a disposition to clarify its intention to invite
the others to the pub and this disposition is apt to manifest itself to an interpreter.
The nature of group agency, however, allows us to construct a revised and final
counterexample.24
8 The counterexample
Assume that for some arcane reason of university bureaucracy, both the teaching
committee and the public engagement committee have the capacity to dissolve
themselves and the other by simply intending to do so. At any point in time, each
group can end its own existence or that of the other group by forming the
appropriate intentions. Let us, furthermore, assume that the two groups have a joint
session at which both of them end their tenure by forming appropriate intentions.
The two intentions are instituted by a committee member stating: ‘‘It is hereby
decided that the teaching committee intends to end its tenure and the public
engagement committee intends to end its tenure.’’
Both groups came to an end, but how could interpretivism settle which group
intended to dissolve which? Did each group intend to dissolve itself or the other? Or
perhaps one group intended to dissolve both? The interpretivist cannot tell. The
actual behaviour of the groups doesn’t justify a difference in attributions. There are
also no dispositions that could be realised after the act of forming the intentions
since the group life ceases immediately. To use Mo¨lder’s phrase, the dispositions
have to be the ‘‘apt to appear or become manifest to interpreters’’, but the groups
cannot manifest any dispositions after they stop existing.
One might try to solve the problem by pointing to behavioural dispositions prior to
forming the intention.25 For example, the groups might have dispositions to clarify
which intentions they are about to form. Just interrupt the speaker after ‘‘It is hereby
decided…’’ and before the end of their sentence and ask about what will be decided.
Under such circumstances the groups would reveal the authorship of the intentions.
However, such cases can also be ruled out with a simple tweak, namely the introduction
of randomness.26 Let the group member say: ‘‘It is hereby decided that if the coin
comes up head the teaching committee intends to end its tenure and the public
engagement committee intends to end its tenure, and if the it comes up tail the
24 I thank Luca Barlassina in helping me to develop this counterexample.
25 I thank Yonatan Shemmer for pressing me on this point.
26 A random event can here just be any event which is not the realisation of a prior disposition. Thus, the
use of randomness does not rely on indeterminism.
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intentions will be the other way round.’’ They then proceed to flip a coin and the
intentions are formed accordingly. Now neither dispositions prior to the formation of
the intentions, nor any later dispositions, can reveal the content of the intentions.27
Consequently, the groups’ intentions remain inaccessible to the interpretivist onlooker.
To summarise my counterexample, we have here a difference in the mental lives
of the two committees, each intended to end itself rather than the other, although it
could have intended to dissolve the other. The interpretivist faces a puzzle: Which
group formed what intention? The group behaviour and realisable dispositions do
not allow us to answer the question.
I do not deny that the group members exhibit a different behaviour because of the
groups’ intentions. Asked which group formed which intention, they can clarify that
each group intended to end itself and not the other. But our neurons also exhibit
behaviour and dispositions when we form an intention, and interpretivism is
committed to not giving them a constitutive role. Only the realisable outer-
behaviour of the entity in question counts, and the groups cannot show such
behaviour after the end of their existence. Interpretivism does not have the resources
to justify the correct attribution of different intentions to the two group agents.
The two special features of group agency pose a particularly difficult challenge to
the interpretivist: Since the groups coincide and are exhaustively constituted by
human individuals, they show no behavioural difference. Nonetheless, the
interpretivist will find it hard to deny the mental difference between the two
groups, because we have access to the mental lives of the groups. We can simply
ask the members about the meeting.
9 Four interpretivist responses
An interpretivist might respond in four ways to my challenge. First, they might be
tempted to deny that we have two groups and try to collapse them into one. They would
attribute the intention to end the committee tenures to the one overarching group.
But collapsing the groups goes against the growing consensus in the group
ontology debate (see Gilbert 1992: 220–221; Uzquiano 2004; Sheehy 2006; Ritchie
2013, 2015; Epstein 2015, 2017; Thomasson 2016): groups which share all their
members can remain numerically distinct. Generally, the argument relies on Leibniz’s
law that a group cannot differ from itself in its properties. Distinct coinciding groups,
so the literature has argued, exhibit different properties. For example, the teaching
committee has duties and a structure which the public engagement committee does
not have. The groups differ in their properties. Leibniz’s law dictates that they cannot
be one group. We must attribute the intentions to separate groups.
Second, interpretivists might accept that the groups are numerically distinct but
suggest that it is indeterminate which group had which intention.28 There would just
27 I used the coin example for simplicity. If we assume that some randomness occurs in the decisions of
individuals, it would suffice to let them decide. In this case, there would also be no doubt that we are
dealing with an inner-mechanism.
28 Dennett (1991b: 48) allows for such indeterminacy.
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not be a matter of the fact whether the teaching and public engagement committee
each ended themselves or the other.
My response relies on the access the individual members have to inner workings
of the groups. If we interrogate them, they will all tell the same story about the
group decisions. Assuming they all properly listened during the meeting, they will
insist that they know that each group ended itself rather than each other. They will
say that they were there when it happened, that they were witnesses to the decision
process. There is a matter of the fact that the coin came up one way or the other at
the group meeting. To those directly involved in the group’s mental life it doesn’t
appear indeterminate.
Given these details about the meeting, that is the inner-mechanisms of the groups
sustaining the outer-behaviour, it appears wrong to endorse indeterminism regarding
the propositional attitudes to the two distinct groups. From the inside everything
appears wholly determined. For the individual members there is no reasonable doubt
about what happened. At least for our example with all its details, endorsing
indeterminism amounts to little more than an admission of inadequacy.
Third, interpretivists could attempt to deny that the groups formed any intentions
at all, because they did not fulfil the requirement for propositional attitudes. This
denial of a mental life would result if we had run afoul to any of the restrictions
Mo¨lder, List and Pettit, and Tollefsen imposed in response to the overgeneration
problem.
As discussed, Mo¨lder objects to the far-fetched sci-fi character of many
counterexamples the literature offers regarding interpretivism. Martian marionettes
lie outside the challenges we usually face in attributing agency. But in the case of
the teaching and the public engagement committee we do not have an empty head
and radio controls. We have two groups, which look like agents with different
mental lives. Folk psychology rules out neither group as an odd fringe case.
Compared with other candidates for group agency, such as the highly complex
nation states or multinational cooperations, the committees of a philosophy
department are innocuous. Excluding these two committees as weird from the scope
of interpretivism would be tantamount to admitting that the interpretivist theories of
group agency offered by Tollefsen and List and Pettit are bust.
List and Pettit restrictions do not apply since there is nothing irrational about the
propositional attitudes of the committees as described in our counterexample. They
behave perfectly rationally as far as our example goes. Tollefsen’s requirement of
linguistic interpretability poses no problem either, since we can stipulate that the
committees engaged in interpretable linguistic behaviour prior to forming their self-
dissolving intentions.29
However, even if interpretivists could find non-ad-hoc restrictions ruling out the
attribution of intentions in our counterexample, this would only suggest that they are
overly strict since the example provides such a clear example of groups with
29 In my counterexample the groups can never comment on these propositional attitudes themselves. It
would be overly demanding, however, if Tollefsen insisted that all propositional attitudes have to be
associated with linguistic expressions. Surely, we don’t need to comment or be disposed to comment on
all our propositional attitudes. So why insist that committees have to?
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propositional attitudes if there are any. Interpretivists would be left with too few
group agents by ruling out groups resembling these committees.
As a fourth response and last refuge, interpretivists could argue that I have drawn
the line between inner-mechanism and outer-behaviour wrongly. If the deliberation
between the teaching committee members, their discussion which group intended
what, were to count as outer-behaviour of the committees, then we could account for
the difference in the mental lives. The behaviour of the members deliberating for the
committees would allow the interpreter to make the correct attribution.
But this retreat renders interpretivism about group agency uninteresting. Interpre-
tivism about individuals is a substantial thesis, because it stops, roughly, at the skull.
As discussed, interpretivism about group agents is only interesting if it endorses an
analogous limit. Tollefsen (2015: 106–107) herself recognises this in her discussion of
the Ford Motor Company: The interpretivist position is interesting because it allows
us to ignore the behaviour of individuals, the discussion between the president of the
company and other members, and exclusively considers the outer-behaviour when we
attribute to the company the intention to raise prices. If the deliberations between the
members also go into the outer-behaviour box, then too little difference to
functionalist accounts of group agency remains. Similarly, an interpretivist who
responds to worries about misattributing intentions to an individual cannot just solve
the issue by categorising neuronal processes as behaviour of the individual.
In conclusion, my counterexample of the coinciding groups establishes that
interpretivists cannot offer an interesting account of group agency and correctly
attribute different mental lives to the coinciding group agents in our example.
10 Towards a functionalist solution
If interpretivism cannot distinguish between the mental lives of the two committees,
how do we pull it off? We know that the teaching committee intended to dissolve
itself, because we know that its members discussed this at the meeting and that the
coin came up a certain way. By looking more closely at the interaction of the
members, we can pry apart the mental lives of the two groups. A functionalism
which considers how the members realise the group’s propositional attitudes has the
capacity to provide the correct answer.
Functionalist proponents of group agency have to explain why details about the
group members matters for the realisation of the teaching committee’s intention.
They must specify the Ramsey sentence for propositional attitudes in such a way
that the intentions are attributed to the appropriate committees. It would be no good,
however, to mention the awareness of group members as a condition for a group to
have an intention. At least, if we want to use the exact same analysis for
propositional attitudes for all kinds of agents, then the condition has to work for
individual as well as group agents. Thus, an explicit mention of group members in
the Ramsey sentence is ruled out.
Nonetheless, the functional profile can be such to allow a difference in the
attribution of the intentions. For example, the Ramsey sentence might demand that
the realiser of an intention stands in a certain causal connection to a realiser of the
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agent’s self-representation. This link to a self-representation of the group would
allow the functionalist to argue why the teaching committee forms one intention and
the public engagement committee the other: There are two self-representations, that
is one for each group and each of them only stands in an appropriate relation to one
of the intention-realisers. In the case of the coinciding group agents, the connection
might be realised through the individual members and how they conceive of their
deliberation. In the case of individual agents, the realiser of such a self-
representation would not involve any members, but some neural state. Demanding
such a causal connection would be on the right level of description: It concerns
internal states but allows for group as well as individual agency.
Of course, the functionalist would have to justify such a requirement
independently of the presented problem case so as not to appear terribly ad-hoc.
My proposal involving self-representation is just one amongst many options which
are opened up by allowing ourselves to draw on the internal states of the agents. To
provide all the details of the functionalist solution, we would need to defend a
general functionalist theory covering all kinds of agents. Such an effort goes beyond
the scope of the present paper and is not needed.
I neither claim to provide nor have to provide the fully specified Ramsey
sentence for propositional attitudes. The inclusion of internal states allows to
account for the attribution of intention in our counterexample in one way or another.
There is plenty of room to find responses to the case of coinciding groups as soon as
we look into the internal lives of group agents. The availability of such a solution
renders functionalism the more attractive theory of group agency. In other words,
while functionalist proponents of group agency face the challenge of providing the
correct Ramsey sentence, interpretivists close the door to a solution.
11 Conclusion
We considered an example of group agency where the internal states of how the
members realise the groups’ mental lives make all the difference, while the outer-
behaviour, realised and dispositional, remains indistinguishable. Interpretivist
accounts cannot deal with these cases since they hold that ‘‘the performance [of
the system] itself should dictate the representations and motivations we ascribe to
the agent’’ (List and Pettit 2011: 28). For the case of coinciding group agents, these
interpretivist approaches fail since the behavioural performances of the groups do
not allow to explain a difference in attributing propositional attitudes. A
functionalism which looks beyond the performance of the system and considers
how internal mechanisms realise it can solve the problem.
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